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Reclaiming our Technological Posterity at the Intersection of Intellectual
Property and Taxation: Uncovering how Patent Pools are Key to Recovering
the Benefits of Charitable IP Contributions
by Kevin Christopher*
Summary
The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004
significantly limited the tax benefits to companies for
charitable donations of intellectual property. This
has arguably restricted within the U.S. the influence
and distribution of technology to limited or nondeveloping user groups, such as nonprofits and
universities. Notwithstanding this decrease in benefits,
the growth of an international licensing model may
provide a new domestic framework for exploiting tax
provisions surrounding charitable IP contributions
through the operational mechanics of patent pools.
Increased consideration of patent pools is important
for other reasons as well. The growth of university
commercialization offices facilitating enhanced
industry-academic relations and the increasing
complexity of commercial products, most notably in
the biotech field, are just a sampling of factors calling
for broadened use of large-scale collaborative models of
exchange.
How, then, can U.S. firms take advantage of
implicit pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits through
the patent pool structure; or, more specifically, how
can firms donate their shelved, unworkable patents
towards a common good, while also taking advantage
of goodwill and federal tax incentives? While this
article does not offer a prettily packaged answer to
the question, it does provide a useful analysis of the
relevant IP and taxation principles and concerns
that must be factored into any attempt at a soluble
approach towards a balancing of the respective federal
and societal interests involved. This article fits squarely
at the intersection of intellectual property and tax
law, exploring cooperative developments seeking to
disseminate intellectual property while circumventing
tax limitations of the Jobs Act.
In order to test the workability of a tax-friendly
patent pool, one must first grasp the relevant law and
theory establishing patent pools generally, and more
specifically patent pools as charitable contribution
stores. Section I thus surveys environmental conditions
leading to the creation of modern patent pools, and
defines modern patent pools. Section II surveys the

landscape of the U.S. federal tax provisions governing
technology transfer, with a particular emphasis on
establishing intellectual property transfers as charitable
contributions. Section III makes use of the IP and
tax related principles and rules though a case study
involving an international patent pool devoted to
environmental sustainability and cleantech innovation.
I.

Creation and Supporting Environments of
Modern Patent Pools

Modern patent pools are relational constructs
designed to overcome common problems associated ith
corporate ownership of advanced technologies. These
relationships are fused by shared interests of product
development; they are also stressed by the competitive
positions of researchers and executives involved, and
by the oversight of antitrust and tax regulators. These
facilitators and hindrances are analyzed in greater detail
below.
A. A Brief Note on the Cooperative Landscape of
Academia
This article explores the functions of patent
pools, which are intellectual property collectives of
otherwise-competing corporate entities. Because
sandbox etiquette learned in the laboratory spills over
to the boardroom, it is worthwhile to first consider
in this critique some cooperative strains of patent
pools amongst academic researchers.1 In the academic
arena, “user innovators” have adopted a widespread
“social norm” of ignoring others’ intellectual property
rights during the course of research.2 A general lack
* Kevin Christopher is a 2011 graduate of the University of
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the UC Hastings Law and Bioscience (L.A.B.) Project. The author
thanks Professors Robin Feldman and Dominick Daher, fellow
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1. Insular institutional norms may negatively influence
the later work of researchers, students, and even administrators.
Fortunately, academic institutions are increasingly investing in
programs dedicated to mentoring entrepreneurial researchers in the
business arts. Notable examples include the California Institute for
Quantitative Biosciences (http://qb3.org/) and the IC2 Institute at
the University of Texas (http://www.ic2.utexas.edu/).
2. Katherine J. Strandburg, User Innovator Community Norms
at the Boundary Between Academic and Industrial Research, 77
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of enforcement sustains this practice, and is likely due
to an emphasis on innovation per se, as opposed to a
commercial emphasis on innovation for profit.3 In
other words, academics seek glory in publication, rather
than proliferation, and in this vein tread harshly on the
discovery rights of their colleagues. This self-interested
approach to publication leads to a normalized
takings research mentality. However, when requests
are properly made for use of protected technologies
during the course of research, there is widespread
dissatisfaction with delay and general resistance to peerrelated lending and facilitation.4 In sum, academic
research environments tend to foster a general mindset
of resistance to cooperative relationships, stemming
mostly from competitive pursuits of publication that
inevitably impact institutional prestige, funding, and
royalties.5
At the intersection of academic science
and industry, commercialization partnerships
have greatly increased, exemplified by a tripling of
university funding sourced from private industry,
with a concurrent five-fold increase in the share of
domestic patents sourced at the university level.6
Still, university-sourced patents represent a mere six
percent of the United States Patent and Trademark
Office’s (“USPTO”) annual registry.7 While collegial
commercialization developments are outside the focus
of this article, it should be noted that universities
present valuable proving grounds for novel methods
of innovation, both in the laboratory and executive
boardroom.8
Fordham L. Rev. 2237, 2257 (2009).
3. Katherine J. Strandburg, Norms and the Sharing of
Research Materials and Tacit Knowledge, in Working within
the Boundaries of Intellectual Property Transactions:
Innovation Policy for the Knowledge Society 85, 85
(Rochelle C. Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2010). But see Bronwyn H. Hall,
On Copyright and Patent Protection for Software and Databases: A
Tale of Two Worlds, in Econ., L. & Intell. Prop. 259, 261 (Ove
Granstrand ed. 2003) (noting that “in reality R&D environments
display a continuum between the most private industry settings and
the ‘open source’ community”).
4. See Strandburg, supra note 3, at 87 (Interestingly, whether
a scientific tool requested by a collegial entity is patented has little
impact on a solicited holder’s refusal to share materials).
5. See, e.g., the University of California San Francisco,
Office of Technology Management, academicaffairs.ucsf.edu/
welcome2009/OTMflyer.pdf (“Without strong research, there will
be no commercialization”).
6. See Hall, supra note 3, at 264-65.
7. Id.
8. See, e.g., Ron Leuty, UCSF harvesting Big Pharma deals:
Pfizer, Bayer and Sanofi seed new crop of drugs, S.F. Bus. Times, Jan.
21, 2011, available at http://www.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/
print-edition/2011/01/21/ucsf-harvesting-big-pharma-deals.html
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B. Cooperative Corporate America and the Role
of the Patent Pool
For commercial developers, the landscape of
innovation and invention is more complex. While
academics work on specific projects within narrowed
academic fields, commercial developers make products
interfacing numerous technological fields, often already
covered by thousands of patents and trade secrets.9
Due to the USPTO’s specificity requirements,10
even the most basic products incorporate patents to
numerous subcomponents resulting in “IP thickets”
that hinder development of many socially beneficial
technologies.11 Modern product developers often find
themselves in a web of licensing, stymieing otherwise
straightforward executive agendas.12 Navigating
patent thickets have thus led to innovative forms of IP
transactions, including “patent trolls,”13 whereby third(reporting on direct industry investment into UCSF research in
excess of $100 million); Carol Mimura, Nuanced Management of IP
Rights: Shaping Industry-University Relationships to Promote Social
Impact, in Working within the Boundaries of Intellectual
Property Transactions: Innovation Policy for the
Knowledge Society 269, 285 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss et al. eds.,
2010) (discussing the Socially Responsible Licensing Program at
the University of California, Berkeley, an effort to provide accessible
pharmaceuticals to developing countries).
9. See O’Connor, IP Transactions as Facilitators of the
Globalized Innovation Economy, in Working within the
Boundaries of Intellectual Property Transactions:
Innovation Policy for the Knowledge Society 204, 204
(Rochelle C. Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2010).
10. See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03, 112 (2011) (outlining
requirements of novelty, non-obviousness, and written specificity for
inventions seeking patent protection).
11. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bargaining Over the Transfer
of Proprietary Research Tools: Is this Market Failing or Emerging?,
in Expanding the Boundaries of Intellectual Property
Transactions: Innovation Policy for the Knowledge
Society 223, 223 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, et al. eds., 2001) (“As
intellectual property claims proliferate in rapidly advancing fields
of technology, new research paths often cross the boundaries of
many prior patents. Without an exemption from infringement
liability, subsequent innovators need licenses from multiple
predecessors to pursue such research projects. Whether this state
of affairs promotes innovation or retards it is an empirical question
of considerable complexity.”); Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the
Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111
Harv. L. Rev. 621, 684 (1988); Merges, Institutions for Intellectual
Property Transactions: The Case of Patent Pools, in Expanding
the Boundaries of Intellectual Property Transactions:
Innovation Policy for the Knowledge Society 123, 126
(Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, et al. eds., 2001) (“The basic idea is that
granting too many property rights of too small a scale can preclude
effective exploitation of economic resources.”)
12. See O’Connor, supra note 9, at 204.
13. Joe Brennan, et al., Patent Trolls in the U.S., Japan,
Taiwan, and Europe, 13 CASRIP Newsletter (Spring/Summer
2006), available at http://www.law.washington.edu/Casrip/
Newsletter/default.aspx?year=2006&article=newsv13i2BrennanEt
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party speculators or aggregators buy up IP to enforce or
resell the rights, and patent pools, a more cooperative
framework of IP centralization.14
1. Historical Basis and Evolution of the
Patent Pool
Patent rights are property rights employing
a “tradeoff model” balancing the costs of monopoly
with a legal inducement of innovation.15 Patent pools
began with “repeat-play” bargaining groups anticipating
sustained business interactions involving one another’s
property rights.16 These early innovators formed the
administrative entities recognizable today and are
responsible for broad licensing of bundled IP rights
assigned by member donors.17 Today, organizations
like the American Society of Composers, Authors,
and Publishers (“ASCAP”), have bundled IP rights to
issue blanket licenses, thereby significantly reducing
transaction costs for expansive, centralized commercial
inventories.18 In turn, royalties are distributed
according to weighted value of licensed property.19
2. Principles of Modern Patent Pools
Patent pools mirror the blanket issuance
framework used by ASCAP, though in this sense
patent inventories are administered primarily to
donor members, with varying reservations for thirdparty licensing.20 Simply stated, a patent pool is
created when patent holders assign or license their
rights to an independent entity with authority to
exploit those rights through further licensing or
manufacturing endeavors.21 Licensees benefit from
Al (identifying a patent troll, patent extortionist, patent parasite,
patent pirate, patent speculator, patent mafia, or patent rougue as
“somebody who tries to make a lot of money off a patent that they
are not practicing and have no intention of practicing and in most
cases they never practiced at all.”).
14. See O’Connor, supra note 9, at 204.
15. See Standard Oil Co. Ind. v. Unites States, 283 U.S. 163,
167-68 (1931); Merges, supra note 11, at 123; see also Kenneth J.
Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources to Invention,
in The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activities (Richard
R. Nelson ed., 1962), reprinted in Essays in the Theory of RiskBearing (Markham Pub. Co. ed., 1971).
16. Merges, supra note 11, at 128.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 129.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 133 (While helpful to distinguish the modern
modes of pooling, Professor Merges’ singular definition is adequate
for purposes of this article); see also Verbeure, Patent Pooling for
Gene-based Diagnostic Testing: Conceptual Framework, in Gene
Patents and Collaborative Licensing Models: Patent Pools,
Clearinghouses, Open Source Models and Liability Regimes

pools by way of “all-in-one license[s]” circumventing
the need for individually securing licenses from patent
owners.22 On the one hand, patent pools “regularize
frequent interactions” among technologically complex
industries with complementary patents, while on the
other hand, patent pools provide a one-stop shop for
diffuse producers and bulk purchasers.23 Patent pools
also eliminate stacking licenses or reduce defensive
aggregation, decrease patent litigation, enhance
technical exchange of non-patented work, and generally
stimulate funding to all pool members.24 Drawbacks
associated with patent pools include skepticism over
industry coordination as a detriment to consumer
interests, as well as uncertainty in the form of coalition
stability.25 Moreover, patent pools may “shield invalid
patents…entail inequitable renumerations… [and] have
anticompetitive effects.26 Scholars generally disagree as
to the proportional benefits of patent pool membership
with respect to producers versus consumers, large-scale
as opposed to small-scale developers, and private groups
contrasted with public groups.27
3, 5 (Geertui Van Overwalle ed. 2009) (discusses three types of
patent pools unofficially known as “joint licensing schemes,” “patent
pools with a licensing administrator,” and “patent platforms.”).
22. Verbeure, supra note 21, at 5.
23. Merges, supra note 11, at 130.
24. See Geertrui Van Overwalle, Designing Models to Clear
Patent Thickets in Genetics, in Working within the Boundaries
of Intellectual Property Transactions: Innovation Policy
for the Knowledge Society 305, 309 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss et.
al , Diane L. Zimmerman, & Harry First eds., 2010).
25. See Steffen Brenner, Optimal formation rules for patent
pools, 40 Econ. Theory 373, 374 (2009).
26. See Van Overwalle, supra note 24 at 309.
27. See Yochai Benkler, A Political Economy of the Public
Domain: Markets in Information Goods Versus the Marketplace of
Ideas, in Expanding the Boundaries of Intellectual Property
Transactions: Innovation Policy for the Knowledge Society
267, 273 (“[I]ncreases in the scope and reach of property rights
benefit commercial producers who sell information goods, at the
expense both of noncommercial producers and of producers who
appropriate the benefits of their production by means other than
the sale of rights…Moreover, increases in the scope and reach of
property rights favor large scale organizations that own information
inventories over small scale organizations (including individuals)
that do not own such inventories.”); see also Ashish Arora, Andrea
Fosfuri, & Alfonso Gambardella, Markets for Technology and
Corporate Strategy, in Econ., L & Intell. Prop. 77, 105 (Ove
Granstrand ed. 2003) (pointing out the opportunities for startups
and small firms to profit from technology trade “even if they are
unable to mobilize the costly assets to develop, produce and sell
[their proprietary technologies]”); Rudy Santore, Michael McKee
& David Bjornstad, Patent Pools as a Solution to Efficient Licensing
of Complementary Patents? Some Experimental Evidence, 53 J. L. &
Econ. 167, 182 (2010) (“Our laboratory experiments show that
profit-seeking agents can coordinate licensing arrangements in
complicated situations fairly effectively with the opportunity to
set prices jointly. In the case of strictly complementary patents,
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3. Structuring a Patent Pool
Upon its establishment, the first priorities
for a patent pool are determining rates for access to
the entire pool and how income will be distributed
to donor members.28 Patent pool makers must
consider how exchange and enforcement costs will
drive membership, with lower transactional costs
inviting increased activity.29 As an important note for
the tax discussion below, a patent pool “regularizes
the valuation of individual patents” by creating “a
division of royalties according to the value attributed
the gains arising from permitting collusion (measured as market
efficiency) appear to be substantial, and the extreme examples of
coordination failure are avoided.”); Verbuere, supra note 21, at
26 (“Patent pools may raise visibility and accessibility towards
smaller or public genetic laboratories and thus may increase the
actual amount of collected royalties by increasing its mass, thereby
bridging the gap between potential and actual revenue.”). But
see Jorge A. Goldstein, Critical Analysis of Patent Pools, in Gene
Patents and Collaborative Licensing Models: Patent
Pools, Clearinghouses, Open Source Models and Liability
Regimes 50, 56 (Geertrui Van Overwalle ed. 2009) (“Especially
in the biopharmaceutical sector, players are confronted by large
costs and long regulatory times, and are not inclined to pool their
IP with that of others who may not have invested the large sums
required for drug or diagnostic approvals. The biopharma culture
is much more like that of a solitary long-distance runner with one
winner and multiple also-rans, that that of a team of synchronized
swimmers.”); Brenner, supra note 25 at 374 (“In general, the social
and private benefits of pool creation do not coincide.”).
28. See Merges, supra note 11, at 131.
29. Id. at 132; see also Brenner, supra note 25, at 374
(observing that the benefit to social welfare is a function of
decreased competition, increased membership, and reduced
pricing).
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by the parties to their respective claims.”30 A pool
must also consider whether its administrative functions
will be executed through an independent group or
an independently operated subgroup of particular
donors.31 Typical administrative powers include adding
and subtracting property rights to or from the bundle
of rights, restructuring royalty payments, and settling
disputes.32
An effective patent pool contains three
essential elements: contributing members with access
to all pooled patents, available licensing plans for noncontributing members, and a formulaic distribution of
licensing fees that weighs the contributory importance
of pooled technologies.33 A pooling collective should
offer a streamlined and accessible menu of prices
and terms to licensees only after “extensive internal
consultation”34 involving patent attorneys, technical
experts, and legal counsel – a “long, complex, multi30. See Merges, supra note 11, at 133; see also Standard Oil Co.
Ind. v. Unites States, 283 U.S. 163, 167-68 (1931).
31. See Lawrence A. Horn, Case 1. The MPEG LA Licensing
Model: What Problems Does it Solve in BioPharma and Genetics?, in
Gene Patents and Collaborative Licensing Models: Patent
Pools, Clearnighouses, Open Source Models and Liability
Regimes 33, 36 (Geertui Van Overwalle ed. 2009) (“The license
administrator is neither licensor nor licensee (nor an affiliate of
any); both are customers, thus assuring impartial administration of
the joint license with a goal of balancing reasonable access for users
with reasonable return to patent owners. Each licensing program is
administered separately, fairly and impartially.”).
32. See Merges, supra note 11, at 140.
33. Id. at 129.
34. Id. at 131.
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step process.”35 Patents included in the pool must be
enforceable under antitrust laws, and must not exclude
complimentary patents.36 Patentees should preserve
some authority over licensing conditions and should
commit under non-exclusive terms.37 Indeed, a survey
of sixty-three patents from 1895 to 2001 found that
pools of complimentary patents generally featured
independent licensing provisions and grantbacks.38
4. Model Patent Pools and Industry Impact
Patent pools can be “creatures of necessity”
when previously registered patents control foundational
technologies necessary for entry into a high-tech
commercial field, or towards development of certain
commercial products.39 Inasmuch, successful patent
pools are usually those linked to complex technologies
that could not otherwise be broadly developed, if at
all. As discussed below, patent pools are currently
responsible for important consumer electronics, and are
poised to serve as vehicles for biotech development.
a. MPEG-LA & MPEG-2
MPEG-2 was first created by the licensing
agent MPEG-LA to combine 29 video compression
patents among 9 international patent holders.40
MPEG-LA administers the pool and licenses the patent
portfolio to outside developers.41 In 2001, MPEGLA included fourteen patent-holding members with

35. See Verbeure, supra note 21, at 7.
36. See Richard Gilbert, The Essentiality Test for Patent Pools, in
Working within the Boundaries of Intellectual Property:
Innovation Policy for the Knowledge Society 326, 341-43
(Rochelle C. Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2010).
37. See Verbeure, supra note 21, at 7, 14; see also Princo Corp.
v. Intern’l Trade Comm’n, 2010 WL 338593 (August 30, 2010);
Thomas V. Vakerics, Antitrust Basics, § 11.02 at 6, 7 (2009) (“It
is well established that a patentee may license or assign its patent,
vesting a licensee with full rights under the patent or a limited right
to practice the teachings of the patent. In licensing a patent, it is
also well established that a licensor may impose restrictions on the
use of the patent, even where those restrictions are designed to limit
competition in practicing the patent.”).
38. See Josh Lerner, Marcin Strojwas & Jean Tirole, The
Design of Patent Pools: The Determinants of Licensing Rules, 38
RAND J. of Econ. no. 3, 610-25 (2007); see also Vakerics, supra
note 37, at 10 (“A grantback provision requires the licensee to
license back to the licensor any related technology, including
patented technology, which the licensee may develop during the life
of the original license agreement…grantbacks are in fairly common
use throughout the United States in patent licensing agreements.”).
39. See Merges, supra note 11, at 134.
40. See MPEG-LA, http://www.mpegla.com/main/default.
aspx (MPEG-LA is the self-touted “pioneer of patent pools”) (last
visited April 10, 2011); see also Merges, supra note 11, at 147.
41. See MPEG-LA, supra note 40.

fifty-six essential patents.42 Today, MPEG-LA includes
twenty-seven members with hundreds of essential
patents and over 1500 licensees.43 Some notable
features of the MPEG-2 pool include the following: (i)
blanket licensing; (ii) a royalty based system according
to representation; (iii) expert administrative valuation
procedures for determining royalties and licensing
fees; (iv) a negotiation framework for determining
value of new entries to the pool combined with expert
analysis initially surveying 8,000 patents for inclusion;
(v) categorization according to “essential patents”
(foundational) and “related patents” (improvement);
(vi) opt out provisions directed to pool members to
protect bargaining leverage, not applicable to essential
patents; and finally, (vii) a dispute resolution program.44
b. DVD4C & DVD6C
In addition to the MPEG-LA patent pool,
another successful single-technology patent pool
involves DVD technology. The modern patent pools
DVD4C and DVD6C were originally a collaborative
ten-member pool administering DVD technologies
that eventually split into two pools for ideological
reasons.45 The DVD4C pool now consists of four
of the ten core members, while DVD6C retains the
other six members and includes a portfolio of over 800
patents.46 The DVD pools are noteworthy because
two competing pools covering the same technology
were able to further the industry as a whole.47 The
members of the patent pools administer their respective
members, while employing an independent expert
for valuation purposes.48 Other single-technology
patent pools have included digital video broadcasting,
synthetic fibers, flat-panel speakers, and RAM memory
chips.49 Notwithstanding that advantages of the patent
pool, some goods produced by the “sweat of the brow,”
including some software, books, musical compositions,
games, and audio and video productions, have little
use for collaborative arrangements such as patent pools
since there are few obstacles to producing viable and
useful products in those industries.50
42. Id.
43. Id. at http://www.mpegla.com/main/programs/M2/Pages/
Intro.aspx (last visited April 10, 2011).
44. See Merges, supra note 11, at 147-49.
45. Id. at 150-52; see also Van Overwalle supra note 24, at
310.
46. See Van Overwalle, supra note 24, at 310.
47. See Merges, supra note 11, at 147-49.
48. Id. at 152.
49. Id. at 154.
50. See Hall, supra note 3, at 261; see also Benkler, supra
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c. Potential For Biotech
The USPTO has long endorsed patent pools
in the biotech industry.51 The biotech industry is
particularly noteworthy “because of the density of
the relationships and the speed and complexity of
its organizing process.”52 Yet despite the speed of its
scientific developments, biotech suffers from similar
delays that plague academia.53 Other difficulties
particular to biotech include inflated valuation for
unproven discoveries.54
d.

Corporate Appeal of Pooling

Academics studying IP development have
observed a rise of corporate strategic alliances,
indicating the heightened importance of transactions
for deployment of information technology.55 Within
this burgeoning transactional economy, globalization
note 27, at 269 (“[B]ecause people and organizations who
produce information for different motivations and with different
organizational constraints are likely to produce different types of
information content, decisions about property rights in information
content must be held to a normative accounting in terms of their
effects on the patterns of, strategies for, and ultimately the locations
and content of information production in our society.”).
51. See Jeanne Clark, Joe Piccolo, Brian Stanton, &
Karin Tyson, Patent Pools: A Solution to the Problem of Access in
Biotechnology Patents? 8 USPTO White Paper (2000) (“For example,
the recent patent pool encompassing MPEG-2 technology led to the
rapid formation of a standardized protocol to protect copyrighted
works on the Internet. Similarly, patent pools can eliminate the
problems associated with blocking patents or stacking licenses in
the field of biotechnology, while at the same time encouraging the
cooperative efforts needed to realize the true economic and social
benefits of genomic inventions.”).
52. Walter W. Powell, Networks of Learning in Biotechnology:
Opportunities and Constraints Associated with Relational Contracting
in a Knowledge-Intensive Field, in Expanding the Boundaries of
Intellectual Property Transactions: Innovation Policy for
the Knowledge Society 251, 263 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, et al.
eds., 2001).
53. See Eisenberg, supra note 11, at 225 (noting that in
the biotech industry lengthy negotiations “over the transfer
of proprietary research tools present[s] a considerable and
growing obstacle to progress in biomedical research and product
development”); see also Powell, supra note 52, at 259 (“As the
structure of the [biotechnology] field became shaped more and
more by interorganizational relations, the nature of competition was
altered. The participants had to adjust to the novel view that it was
no longer necessary to have exclusive, proprietary ownership of an
asset in order to extract value from it.”).
54. See Eisenberg, supra note 11, at 243 (“[T]ool users within
each sector share the perception that tool-providers in other sectors
are asking too much and overvaluing the contribution of particular
tools relative to other inputs that contribute to future valuable
discoveries.”).
55. See Ashish et al., supra note 27, at 80 (observing alliances
“ranging from R&D joint ventures and partnerships, spinoffs, corporate venture capital, licensing deals, and a variety of
‘outsourcing’ deals”).
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and favorable market forces have led to largescale exploitation of technology through licensing
arrangements.56 Similarly, diversity of scalable
technologies, along with the diffusion of technological
producers, means that companies committed to
internal research and development departments
are unnecessarily “reinventing the wheel.”57 These
companies that have not explored pooling arrangements
are missing valuable commercial opportunities for
research and development investment.
II. Federal Tax Standards for Technology
Transfer and Patent Donations
Patent rights granted to patentees are arguably
extensions of a government’s taxation powers, thus
it is no surprise that the field of patent law is strictly
regulated under existing U.S. tax laws.58 Specifically,
“[in] the patent area, the most frequently arising issues
with respect to the tax laws are whether a transfer
of patent rights is a sale or a non-exclusive license;
whether royalties from a patent are capital gains or
ordinary income; and…whether and when royalties
are deductible.”59 The “patent pool paradox”60 raises
additional tax issues for the effective transfer of patent
rights as charitable contributions.61 The following
sections explore the parameters of tax benefits available
to participants in patent pools through licensing or
donative arrangements.
A. Historical Governance of Patent Transfers
A patent right is a property right and is
56. Id. at 89.
57. Id. at 95-96; see also Wesley M. Cohen, Akira Goto, Akiya
Nagata, Richard R. Nelson & John P. Wash, R&D Information
Flows and Patenting in Japan and the United States, in Econ., L. &
Intell. Prop. 123, 135 (Ove Granstrand ed. 2003) (“[I]n complex
product industries, firms rarely have proprietary control over all
the essential complementary components of the technologies they
are developing. Firms hold rights over technologies that others
need, and vice-versa, creating a condition of mutual dependence
that fosters extensive cross-licensing, related negotiations and
information sharing.”).
58. See Ove Granstrand, Innovations and Intellectual Property
Studies: An Introduction and Overview of a Developing Field, 15,
in Econ., L. & Intell. Prop. 9, 15 (Ove Granstrand ed. 2003)
(“Handing out privileges and property rights was (and is) simply a
handy way for rulers and governments to influence the economics
of innovation…In fact, this policy could be seen as a special use of
taxation powers, in the sense that some of these powers are handed
over under certain conditions to innovators who, at their discretion
for a limited time, can tax consumers through higher prices on the
innovations.”).
59. I.R.S. Non-Docketed Advice Rev. 5395 (Aug. 7, 1998).
60. I.R.S. Chief Counsel Advisory 201025072, at *3 (Jan. 27,
2009) (General Counsel presentation).
61. See 47A C.J.S. Internal Revenue § 211 (2011).
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transferable.62 The transferred right is “the right to
exclude.”63 Since charitable contributions of patent
rights are a relatively recent phenomenon, much of
the legal record has concerned corporate or trustee
dealings.64 Notwithstanding, it is clear that until
recently the standard for valuation of transferred
patent rights, whether pooled or not, was fair market
value. Conversely, acquired patents were extended
amortization rights for basis in cost.65 It was during this
era that companies such as Dow Chemical and Xerox
recouped millions from over-inflated patent portfolios
through strategic tax-friendly transfers. 66
B. Modern Governance of Charitable IP
Donations
The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004
62. See Vakerics, supra note 37, at 3 (“The patent laws
specifically provide that patents shall have the attributed of personal
property. The fact that patents are a form of property has also
been recognized by the Supreme Court. More precisely, a patent
is generally viewed as a form of intellectual property, as the patent
grant itself is an intangible legal right. As a form of property, a
patent can be the subject of an assignment which transfers title to
the patent from the patentee to the assignee.”).
63. Special Equipment v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370, 378 (1945).
64. See Charitable Contributions of Intellectual Property,
Licensing Econ. Rev., (Oct 2003); see also, e.g., Appeal of
National Pneumatic Co., 5 B.T.A. 637 (1926) (“No hard and fast
rule can be laid down for determining the value of patents paid
in for capital stock of a corporation…The value is a question
of fact in any case.”); Mitchell Camera Corp. v. Comm’r, 1947
WL 8088, at *1 (T.C. June 24, 1947) (bemoaning the absence
of a statutory formula for determining depreciation of acquired
patents); Cutter Lab. Inc., v. Lyophile-Cryochem Corp., 179 F.2d
80, 80 (9th Cir. 1949) (addressing patent pools and evaluating the
royalty-free exchange between two firms concentrated on different
technologies); Talge v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 836, 836 (W.D.
Mo. 1964) (distinguishing gift tax from income tax responsibilities
for patents transferred in trust); Thomson v. U.S., 1969 WL 175, at
*1 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 31, 1969) (advising against wholesale denial of
capital gains treatment for royalty-based exchange of patents).
65. I.R.S. Non-Docketed Advice Rev. 5395 (Aug. 7, 1998);
see also Catherine L. Hammond, The Amortization of Intangible
Assets: § 197 of the Internal Revenue Code Settles the Confusion, 27
Conn. L. Rev. 915, 933-34 (1995).
66. See Ashish et al., supra note 27, at 90 (“In 1997 Xerox had
8,000 patents, earning only $8.5 million in revenues, not covering
even the maintenance costs. Xerox set in motion a systematic
process for cataloguing and evaluating its patent portfolio, pruning
and giving away (often to universities) patents it did not wish to
keep.”); Ron Layton & Peter Bloch, Please Donate Patents on the
Shelf; Tax Benefits can be Focused for Greater Good, Legal Times
Magazine, Mar. 15, 2004, at 2 (“The value of donations has
been clearly significant. Speaking for Dow Chemical at a 2001
conference, Rick Gross provided some hard numbers. He said
Dow had discovered that ’25 percent of our patents had no business
value. We downsized the portfolio over 10,000 patents and saved
over $40 million in five years. Additionally, the donation of unused
intellectual property resulted in millions of dollars of tax credits
over the past six years.’”).

altered this landscape dramatically, eliminating the
fair market value standard.67 While the Act does not
establish new standards for effective contributions,68
it reduces the monetary incentives for charitable IP
donations.69 The intent of the Act was “to prevent
taxpayers from claiming a deduction in excess of basis
with respect to charitable contributions of intellectual
property,” fueled by the “highly speculative” nature of
IP valuation resulting in charities receiving assets “of
questionable value” offsetting significant tax benefits to
donor taxpayers.70
Title 26 of the U.S. Code, Section 170,
governing charitable IP contributions, can now be
summarized as follows:71
1. A contribution is deductible only
if made to an organization…
organized and operated for
religious, charitable, scientific,
67. See Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 882, 118 Stat. 1418, 1627
(2004); Xuan-Thao Nguyen & Jeffrey A. Maine, Giving Intellectual
Property, 39 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1721, 1746 (2006) (“[The Act]
eliminates the fair market value standard and reduces the amount
a donor can deduct. The new legislation applies to most forms
of intellectual property, including patents, certain copyrights,
trademarks, trade names, trade secrets, and know-how, certain
software, and similar intellectual property or applications or
registrations of such property.”); see also 47A C.J.S. Internal Revenue
§ 211, supra note 61, at 3 (“The 2004 Jobs Creation Act adds the
rules that a deduction for the contribution of patents and other
intellectual property is limited to the fair market value of the patent
of the donor’s basis in it, whichever is less. The donor can take an
additional deduction, however, for income earned by the donee
from the contributed property; the amount of the deduction is
limited by a sliding percentage scale provided in the Code.”).
68. I.R.S. Non-Docketed Advice Rev. 5395 (Aug. 7, 1998)
(“Where less than substantial rights to a patent are transferred, the
right conveyed is merely a license, giving the licensee no title in the
patent.”); see also 47A C.J.S. Internal Revenue § 211, supra note 61,
at 2 (“Generally, a charitable deduction will be disallowed, where
the taxpayer retains control over the purported gift. Delivery of
a charitable contribution under the Code occurs when title in the
property vests in the donee so as to provide the donee with power
to exercise dominion and control…As a rule, a contribution in
the statutory sense proceeds from a ‘detached and disinterested
generosity’ and not from the anticipation of economic benefit,
or other specific, measurable quid pro quo.”); Rev. Rul. 2003-28,
2003-1 C.B. 594 (denying a charitable contribution to a donee
contributing a patent to a university but “retaini[ng] a substantial
right such as the right to license the patent to others”); Nguyen
& Maine, supra note 67, at 1739-40 (“In order to qualify for an
income tax charitable deduction under [S]ection 170 of the Internal
Revenue Code…the taxpayer must transfer “all substantial rights”
in a patent, defined as ‘all rights which are of value at the time the
rights to the patent are transferred.”).
69. See Nguyen & Maine, supra note 67, at 1725.
70. See S. Rep. No. 108-192, at 217 (2003).
71. See e.g., Joseph E. Olsen, Federal Taxation of IP Transfers §
5.12 (2009).
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literary or educational purposes…
with no earnings inuring to the
benefit of any private shareholder
or individual…and the
organization must not attempt to
influence legislation;72
2. The amount of charitable
deduction is limited to the lesser
of the basis of the property or fair
market value;73
3. Further deduction is allowable to
the taxpayer according to a sliding
scale of the future income that the
charitable organization receives
from the donation;74 and,
4. This qualified deduction extends
only up to twelve years beyond
the donation,75 and applies to
amounts in excess of the original
claimed deduction.76
Other restrictions for charitable contributions
include:
1. Distributions from donor advised
funds that are for non-charitable
purposes are taxable, as are
certain transactions between
a donor advised fund and its
donors, donor advisors, or related
persons;77
2. Transfers of property to a
charitable organization that are
directly related to the donor’s
business and made with a
reasonable expectation of financial
return equivalent to the value of
72. See I.R.C. § 170(c).
73. See § 170(e)(1)(B)(iii).
74. See §§ 170(m)(1), 6050L. A donor is allowed an
additional charitable deduction based on a sliding-scale percentage
of qualified donee income from donated qualified intellectual
property over a to-year period. “Qualified donee income” is any
net income received by or accrued to the donee that is allocable to
qualified intellectual property. “Qualified intellectual property”
includes patents and other intellectual property but does not
include property to certain private nonoperating (grant-making)
foundations. This additional deduction is allowed only to the
extent that it exceeds the deduction amount originally claimed on
the property contribution.
75. See § 170(m)(7).
76. See § 170(m)(2).
77. See §§ 4966-67.
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the transfers do not qualify for
a charitable deduction but may
qualify as a trade or business
expense;78
3. “Contribution in the statutory
sense proceeds from a detached
and disinterested generosity
and not from the anticipation
of economic benefit, or other
specific, measurable quid pro
quo; and a taxpayer will be
denied a charitable deduction
for a conveyance of property
motivated by an expectation of
such substantial benefit as would
provide a quid pro quo for the
transfer and thereby destroy its
charitable nature[;]”79
4. The fair market value of an
undivided interest in a patent
contributed to an appropriate
organization is an allowable
deduction as a charitable
contribution;80
5. Patents are extended limited
amortization rights when
considering general business
expensing;81
6. No deduction is allowed for a
patent transfer when a donor
retains the right to license
the patent to others; rather, a
deduction is allowed if a fully
transferred patent is attached
with certain restrictions for future
license or transfer.82
7. Fraudulent intent could still be
found when operating within all
78. See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(c)(5) (2008).
79. See 47A C.J.S. Internal Revenue § 211, supra note 61, at 2.
80. See Rev. Rul. 58-260, 1958-1 C.B. 126.
81. See I.R.C. § 197; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-6(a);
Hammond, supra note 65 at 933-34. “Section 197 allows for the
straight-line method of amortization for almost all intangible assets
over a fifteen-year period. This rule applies to § 197 intangibles
that were acquired in connection with a trade or business or in a
separate transaction, but it does not apply to self-created intangible
assets, such as the cost of creating a customer relationship through
advertising.” Patents qualify for amortization only to the extent that
they were acquired through the acquisition of a trade or business.
82. See Rev. Rul. 2003-28, supra note 68, at 1, 5.
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the rules of tax governance.83
C. Standards of Exemption for Recipients of
Donated IP
The discussion above focused on tax benefits
available to a corporation donating IP to a qualifying
charitable organization. In Bluetooth SIG Inc. v. United
States, the issue was whether an organization similar to
a patent pool was entitled to exemption from federal
income tax as a business league.84 This is the secondary
tax analysis in forming a patent pool: whether a patent
pool could be structured for maximum tax benefit.
Bluetooth Special Interest Group (“SIG”) was
a Delaware nonprofit created as the administrative
executor of Bluetooth patents and trademarks
transferred from Ericsson, Toshiba, IBM, Intel, and
Nokia. 85 As the aggregator of these Bluetooth patents
and trademarks, Bluetooth SIG develops technological
specifications,86 promotes the technology,87 enforces its
trademark,88 and certifies member technologies.89 SIG’s
4,000 members were grouped according to membership
classes; namely, those with greater development
activities paid larger membership fees in exchange
for reduced licensing fees.90 In the years following
its inception, SIG’s revenues(income) increased
exponentially from about $300,000 in 2000, to over
$6.7 million in 2002, with corresponding increases in
assets and profits.91
83. See S. Rep. No. 108-192, at 220 (2003) (“The fact that a
right to receive payments meets the statutory standard of qualified
interest does not immunize the contribution from such present-law
rules. Accordingly, under the provision, a donor’s contribution
of intellectual property and right to receive payments could,
depending on the facts and circumstances, result in impermissible
private inurement or benefit, or be treated as an excess benefit
transaction for purposes of intermediate sanctions.”).
84. Bluetooth SIG Inc. v. United States, 611 F.3d 617, 617 (9th
Cir. 2010).
85. See id. at 618-19 (identifying Bluetooth as wireless data
transmission technology providing “a language for electronic devices
to talk to one another”).
86. See id. at 619 (observing that Bluetooth SIG develops
specifications “through meetings, conferences, working groups, and
by sharing research results.”).
87. See id. (noting that Bluetooth promoted products by
“conduct[ing] market research, sponsor[ing] trade fairs, and
publish[ing] handouts and flyers for trade shows and other events.”).
88. See id. (noting that SIG employed counsel to protect its
brand both domestically and abroad).
89. See id. (noting that SIG collected member fees for
compliance testing of new products and for any subsequent
development).
90. See id. at 620 (observing that original drafters of the pool
were extended special class privileges, extended to only three other
companies during the course of operation).
91. See id. (stating that most of SIG’s revenue was derived

In 2002, SIG applied for a tax exemption
under I.R.C. § 501(c)(6), which exempts, among
others, “[b]usiness leagues” and “boards of trade.”92
The IRS rejected SIG’s application, drawing a
distinction between a business league’s promotion of
improved business conditions and SIG’s promotion of
a specific technology and discredited SIG’s proposal for
“particular services to particular individuals.”93 Relying
upon Treasury Regulation § 1.501(c)(6)-1,94 the Ninth
Circuit applied a six-factor test to SIG’s status as a
501(c)(6) nonprofit, finding that SIG failed the fourth
and fifth prongs related to “engage[ment] in a business
ordinarily conducted for profit,” and “activities that
are directed to the improvement of business conditions
of one or more lines of business as distinguished
from the performance of particular services for
individual persons.”95 The court reasoned that under
the fourth prong, an association owning patents and
promoting uniform practices associated with relevant
patented technologies, while also granting licenses
to its members under those patents, could not be an
exempt business association.96 Relying upon Revenue
Ruling 70-80, the court found that SIG failed the fifth
prong of the six-factor test for failing to “benefit all or
nearly all members” of a particular consumer-related
industry.97 Essentially, any promotional activity of a
trademark resulting in a competitive advantage within
an industry prevents a finding of acceptable business
league activity.98 By extension, within a collective, like
SIG, fee structures that serve to reduce membership
fees in exchange for enhanced surplus-producing
from membership fees and product registration fees, in equal
portion).
92. See id. at 620-21.
93. See id. at 621 (denoting the IRS’ reasoning to
particularized service concerned the special status of Bluetooth
developers, especially those within the higher ranks).
94. See Treas. Reg. 1.501(c)(6)-1 (1960) (“An organization
whose purpose is to engage in a regular business of a kind ordinarily
carried on for profit, even though the business is conducted on
a cooperative basis or produces only sufficient income to be selfsustaining, is not a business league.”).
95. See Bluetooth SIG, supra note 84, 611 F.3d at 622-24.
96. Id.; see also Rev. Rul. 58-294, 1958-1 C.B. 244 (holding
that an association did not qualify as a business league under section
501(c)(6) when too heavily involved in ownership and promotion
of patented products).
97. Bluetooth SIG, supra note 84, 611 F.3d at 624-25; see
also Rev. Rul. 70-80, 1970-1 C.B. 130 (stating that a “nonprofit
trade association of manufacturers whose principal activity is
the promotion of its members’ products under the associaiton’s
registered trademark does not qualify for exemption under section
501(c)(6) of the Code”).
98. See Bluetooth SIG, supra note 84, 611 F.3d at 625.
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licensing fees do not benefit a definite industry
overall.99 Moreover, SIG’s fee structure benefits some
members over others, which is itself a bar to the
business league exemption.100 Finally, an organization
wishing to be recognized as a business league for
tax purposes cannot make its primary mission the
enhancement of its brand.101
III. Case Study: Applying US Tax Standards to
the Eco-Patent Commons
A. What is the Eco-Patent Commons?
One interesting case to consider is the EcoPatent Commons (“Commons”), a patent pool
promoting tax benefits and public responsiveness
of pooling cleantech resources.102 The emergence
of the Commons can be traced to a resurgence of
both environmental awareness and corporate social
responsibilities.103 Leading companies are recognizing
the finite nature of key resources and publicly
seeking to “dematerialize” their businesses.104 But
while global responsiveness may lead to universal
gain, one drawback to the modern sustainable
consciousness involves the systematic corporate
greenwashing105 of industrial and retail goods.106
The Commons, a partnership between private and
99. Id. at 626.
100. Id. at 627-28.
101. Id. at 628-29 (“Everything that SIG does supports, in
one way or another, the Bluetooth brand which is the organization’s
central asset and focus…Any benefit on the wireless communication
industry or non-Bluetooth manufacturers was, in fact, merely
incidental.”).
102. See, e.g., World Bus. Council for Sustainable Dev.
(WBCSD), http://www.wbcsd.org (last visited Mar. 18, 2011).
103. See Paul Herman, The HIP Investor: Make Bigger
Profits by Building a Better World 28 (2010) (noting American and
Chinese consumer and investor sensitivities to corporate behavior).
104. Id. at 20.
105. See SourceWatch, Greenwashing, http://www.
sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Greenwashing (last visited April
10, 2011) (“Greenwashing is the unjustified appropriation of
environmental virtue by a company, an industry, a government,
a politician or even a non-government organization to create a
pro-environmental image, sell a product or a policy, or to try and
rehabilitate their standing with the public decision makers after
being embroiled in controversy.”).
106. See Dr. Arlo Brady, The Greenrush: Eco-branding,
Brandchannel (August 27, 2007), http://www.brandchannel.
com/brand_speak.asp?bs_id=174 (“The far ranging reach of the
current greenrush has meant that globally, individuals are now
coming into contact with green political and green business brands
and messaging on a regular basis. This increasing familiarity and
exposure to background noise has resulted in a growing climate of
suspicion . . . Many now believe that politicians and business leaders
are just developing clever marketing/branding campaigns designed
solely to increase sales or votes.”).
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nonprofit organizations, takes a novel approach to
environmentalism and corporate social responsibility
by fostering environmentally beneficial technologies
through the cooperative mechanisms of the patent
pool.107 The modus at work is a collective effort to
donate shelved patents from which other members, and
even outside businesses and individuals, could draw
from free of charge.108 Multilateral environmental and
climate change agreements have emphasized the need
to distribute environmentally sustainable technologies,
and open access to patents is one way to meet this
demand.109
The Commons is housed within the World
Sustainable Business Council, a “CEO-led, global
association of some 200 companies dealing exclusively
with business and sustainable development.”110 The
Commons itself holds over one hundred “eco-friendly
patents” pledged by eleven worldwide companies,
including Bosch, Dow, DuPont, Fuji-Xerox, IBM,
Pitney Bowes, Ricoh, Sony, Taisei, and Xerox.111 The
Commons purport a philanthropic and industrial
interest.112 While a membership fee is anticipated,
107. See World Bus. Council for Sustainable Dev. (WBCSD),
Eco-Patent Commons Overview, http://www.wbcsd.org/templates/
TemplateWBCSD5/layout.asp?type=p&MenuId=MTQ3NQ&do
Open=
1&ClickMenu=LeftMenu (last visited Mar. 18, 2011) (“The
Eco-Patent Commons, launched by IBM, Nokia, Pitney Bowes
and Sony in partnership with the WBCSD, was founded on the
commitment that anyone who wants to bring environmental
benefits to market can use these patents to protect the environment
and enable collaboration between businesses that foster new
innovation.”).
108. See Jo Bowman, The Eco-Patent Commons: Caring
Through Sharing, in 3 WIPO Magazine, Mar. 2009, at 11.
109. Krishna Ravi Srinivas, Sink or Swim: Eco-patent
Commons and the Transfer of Environmentally Sustainable
Technologies, International Centre for Sustainable Development
(May 2008), http://ictsd.org/i/news/bioresreview/12098.
110. See World Bus. Council for Sustainable Dev.
(WBCSD), About the WBCSD, http://www.wbcsd.org/templates/
TemplateWBCSD5/layout.asp?type=p&MenuId=NjA&doOpen=1
&ClickMenu=LeftMenu ((last visited Mar. 18, 2011).
111. See WBCSD, Eco-Patent Commons Overview, supra
note 107; see also Bowman, supra note 108, at 11 (noting that
patents include “technology for removing liquid contaminants from
groundwater,” a “method for recycling optical disks,” and “a system
for recycling old mobile phone handsets”).
112. See World Bus. Council for Sustainable Dev.
(WBCSD), Eco-Patent Q&A, http://www.wbcsd.org/templates/
TemplateWBCSD5/layout.asp?type=p&MenuId=MTU2Mg&
doOpen=1&ClickMenu=LeftMenu (last visited Mar. 18, 2011)
(“While the Eco-Patent Commons clearly has an important
philanthropic aspect, its benefits to the business pledging patents
go beyond philanthropy. By forming a Commons, members and
non-members obtain free access to patents pledged by others, and
the opportunity to leverage the Commons to further innovate and

Spring 2011

technology selection for patent inclusion is left to
donor businesses, and charitable contribution status
related to patent renewal fees is inconclusive.113
B. Are Charitable Contributions of IP Deductible
in the Case of the Commons?
The first analysis is whether domestic donors
would be able to exploit beneficial tax provisions
through assignment of patent rights to a collective
licensing entity, such as the Eco-Patent Commons.
This analysis must take into consideration the
relevant tax provisions discussed above. Specifically,
the analysis centers around determination of several
factors, including: the functional nature of the pool;
the value of the donation and/or future income within
explicit limitations; the degree of relation between the
transferring parties; the relevancy of the donation to the
donor’s business; the expectation of financial return; the
anticipation of other benefit; whether ownership of the
patent has been properly relinquished; and evidence of
intentional circumvention of the Jobs Act framework.114

2. Is there value in the type of IP donated to
the Commons?
The value of a charitable donation for tax
purposes is limited to the lesser of the donated
instrument’s basis or fair market value, with an
additional provision for equivalent gains to the
charitable organization in excess of the reported
tax claim.117 Critics of the Commons state that the
majority of the patents held by the Commons are not
very useful, since the intellectual property obstacles to
green tech transfer are relatively few and usability of
donated property is questionable.118 Moreover, some
donor parties to the Commons have freely confessed
the limited market value of donated property.119 Given
the testimonial indifferences to shelved patents, and the
complexities involved in aggregating enough property
rights to develop a product for market from a pool
sourced in goodwill, it is difficult to conceptualize a
standard, or even range, of return for most charitable IP
supporting tax credits.
3. What is the nature of donor/donee
relations within the Commons?

1. Is the Commons a qualified recipient?
In order to qualify as a charitable contribution,
a collective in this instance must be a non-political,
charitable or scientific organization that does not
benefit any private shareholder or individual.115 The
Commons is a nonprofit located in Geneva promoting
environmental awareness, efficiency, and innovation.116
Under this standard, the Commons would seem
to qualify as a qualified charitable recipient. The
Commons’ objective of fostering environmentally
friendly technologies is seemingly indistinguishable
from the objectives of similar environmental
organizations, scientific organizations, or universities
serving similar functions.
establish business relationships with businesses that have similar
interests.”).
113. Id. (It is possible that there could be tax benefits for
making donations or pledges of patents, but it may be difficult to
structure the Commons to enable that benefit, and it may require a
greater degree of governance and operational cost than is currently
being envisioned for the initiative. In any event, this benefit
would greatly depend on the pledger and facts surrounding its tax
situation.”) (emphasis added).
114. See infra Section II.
115. See 26 U.S.C. I.R.C. § 170(c).
116. See World Bus. Council for Sustainable Dev. (WBCSD),
History of the WBCSD, http://www.wbcsd.org/templates/
TemplateWBCSD2/layout.asp?type=p&MenuId=NDEx&doOpe
n=1&ClickMenu=LeftMenu (last visited April 10, 2011); see also
WBCSD, How to Join the Eco-Patent Commons, http://www.wbcsd.
org/web/projects/ecopatent/EcoPatentGroundRules.pdf (last visited
April 10, 2011).

Some transactions between interrelated
parties are taxable.120 In this case, substantial donors
in conjunction with the WBCSD established the
Commons jointly.121 If those foundational donor
(7).

117. See I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(B)(iii); see also § 170(m)(1)-(2),

118. See Hideo Doi, Japan’s Green Technology Plan: Managing
Intellectual Property, International Centre for Sustainable
Development (May 7, 2010), http://ictsd.org/i/press/ictsd-in-thenews/75439/. See generally John H. Barton, Intellectual Property
and Access to Clean Energy Technologies in Developing Countries:
An Analysis of Solar Photovoltaic, Biofuel and Wind Technologies,
ICTSD Trade and Sustainable Energy Series Issue Paper No. 2,
International Centre for Sunstainable Development (December
2007); see also Srinivas, supra note 109 (noting that “while the
patents available under the Eco-Patent Commons represent a
starting point, they have a very limited application in the further
development of technologies in key sectors”).
119. See Steven Seidenberg, Patent Giveaway: Companies
Donate Patents to Promote Ecologically Friendly Innovation, Inside
Counsel, (April 1, 2009) (http://www.insidecounsel.com/
Issues/2009/April-2009/Pages/Patent-Giveaway.aspx) (“Many
patents for green technology will never be donated to the EPC, and
that’s fine with EPC’s backers. They expect businesses will hang
on to patents that generate significant revenue”); id. (wherein Julie
Rakestraw of DuPont notes, “If we won’t commercialize it, and it’s
within EPC guidelines, that makes it a really good candidate for
donating to the Commons”).
120. See I.R.C. §§ 4966-67 (noting that interrelated parties
include those with conflicts of interest brought about by personal
stakes or invested interests in both donor and donee).
121. See WBCSD, Eco-Patent Commons Overview, supra note
107.
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parties are involved in a manner which indirectly
benefits their companies, for instance in designing
beneficial licensing structures as discussed in Bluetooth
SIG, then any donations based upon such interactions
could be barred from charitable status.
4. Are patents donated to the Commons
extensions of donor businesses?
Transfers of property to a charitable
organization that are directly related to the donor’s
business and made with a reasonable expectation
of financial return equivalent to the value of the
transfers do not qualify for a charitable deduction.122
The Commons promotes environmental efficiency
and renewable energy technologies, though donor
organizations are not necessarily active in either
industry.123 The first clause in the conflicts rule
would thus hinge on general corporate benefit. In
discussing corporate gain, some donors have cited
opportunistic gain, the opportunity to draw upon
others’ technologies, or entertain a valuable network
of expertise.124 Critics, meanwhile, have asserted
reputational benefits, noting that the Commons is
free of charge, or that competing companies typically
engage in intercompany exchange solely to avoid
impending litigation.125 Nonpecuniary gains, such as
these, would likely not undermine the rule. However,
because donors retain ownership of donated property
in the sense of renewal fees, a presumption of some
financial gain could arise. To illustrate in a practical
scenario, a donor company could assign the pool the
licensing rights of a blocked patent in the hopes that
similar assignments from others would create sufficient
licensing rights in toto for future product development;
this new potential, whether construed as costs saved
from negotiated licenses or a kind of market expansion,
would signify a financial return.
5. Are donations made to the Commons
detached and disinterested?
A taxpayer will be denied a charitable
deduction for a conveyance of property motivated by
122. See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(c)(5) (2008).
123. See Seidenberg, supra note 119 (expressing that green
technology “is interdisciplinary and covers such a wide variety of
technology – from biotech to business methods, from material
science to physics, from mechanical engineering (wind power)
to photovoltaics, geology (geothermal) and ocean sciences (tidal
power)”).
124. Id; see also Bowman, supra note 108 (quoting Donal
O’Connell of Nokia).
125. See Doi, supra note 118.
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an expectation of such substantial benefit as would
provide a quid pro quo for the transfer and thereby
destroy its charitable nature.126 Here, the nonpecuniary
interests discussed in the previous section would
likely demonstrate expectations distinguishable from
“detached and disinterested generosity.”127 Any
donation motivated by improved public relations,
increased marketability, or other intangible gains,
would not qualify as a charitable deduction.
6. Are any rights withheld by donors giving
to the Commons?
No deduction is allowed for a patent transfer
when a donor retains the right to license the patent to
others, but a deduction is allowed for a transfer carrying
certain restrictions for future license or transfer,
limited by the reduction in fair market value that the
restriction creates.128 Members to the Commons “join
by placing at least one patent into the database, which
they continue to maintain, paying fees as needed.”129
As noted by an IBM executive, the Commons only
employs the “ecological uses” of donated patents,
meaning donors retain exclusive rights to license
mainline uses of patents.130 Effectively, “you can
have your cake and eat it too.”131 Any retained rights,
whether to license outside of or within the pool, would
be barred by charitable recognition. Lastly, Congress
suggested that a bar to recognition may be applied
when operating outside of the purpose and scope of the
rules.132
C. Is the Commons Exempt from Taxation as a
501(c)(6) Organization?
Applying Bluetooth SIG to the same model,
a framework for tax-exempt status of the patent pool
can be illuminated. In Bluetooth SIG, the Ninth
Circuit focused on two principles that are relevant to
the Commons example: 1) engagement in a business
ordinarily performed for profit, and 2) personalized
performance.133 More specifically, the court barred SIG
126. See 47A C.J.S. Internal Revenue § 211, supra note 61.
127. Id.
128. See Rev. Rul. 2003-28, supra note 68.
129. Srivinas, supra note 109.
130. Seidenberg, supra note 119.
131. Id.
132. See S. Rep. No. 108-192, *220 (2003). (warning that
technical obeyance of the newly minted tax rules “could, depending
on the facts and circumstances, result in impermissible private
inurement or private benefit, or be treated as an axcess benefit
transaction for purposes of intermediate sanctions”).
133. See Bluetooth SIG, supra note 84, 611 F.3d at 617, 622.
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from representation as a business league under section
501(c)(6) for the following reasons: owning patents and
promoting them as such; granting licenses with respect
to owned patents; conducting operations not benefiting
substantially all members of a defined trade; branding
to give itself, members, or its products a competitive
edge; profiteering; administering inequitable treatment
within the pool; and, self-branding as its central
focus.134
Similarly to SIG, the Commons is engaging
in business ordinarily performed for profit. As
discussed above, the Commons licenses its intellectual
property freely to members within and, in some
instances, beyond the pool. Currently, the very
nature of licensing is at odds with the tax code: while
donor companies hope for future profitable uses of
their donated property in order to increase charitable
deductions,135 an administrative pool, whether serving
the public interest or not, is restricted from conducting
business in a way ordinarily considered enterprising
or profitable.136 Here, a tax analysis would likely turn
upon a myopic focus on use of an enterprising tool,
as opposed to the broader consideration of social
gains in the fields of innovation and environmental
stewardship.. Perhaps one example of a distinction
would be if patents were licensed freely, not to member
contributors, but to third world or other neglected
representative groups.137
The Commons may also incorporate a certain
degree of personalized performance. The Commons is
still in its infancy, having yet to even establish standard
funding protocols.138 Furthermore, the Commons is
not limited to a specific technology, or even industry,
as was the case in Bluetooth SIG.139 As observed, green
tech itself is an interdisciplinary idea covering diverse
technologies from biotech to business methods.140
The Commons accepts properties from all fields, as
long as they have in their donated form a “purely
environmental aim.”141 In practice, this ranges from
methods for recycling mobile phones to automotive
134. Id. at 622-29; see also Rev. Rul. 58-294, 1958-1 C.B.
244; Rev. Rul. 70-80, 1970-1 C.B. 130.
135. See 26 U.S.C.I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(B)(iii); see also 26
U.S.C.I.R.C. § 170(m)(1)-(2), (7).
136. See Bluetooth SIG, supra note 84, 611 F.3d at 622; see also
Rev. Rul. 58-294, 1958-1 C.B. 244.
137. See generally Mimura, supra note 8.
138. See WBCSD, Eco-Patent Q&A, supra note 112.
139. See Bluetooth SIG, supra note 84, 611 F.3d at 624.
140. See Seidenberg, supra note 119.
141. Bowman, supra note 108 (quoting Maria Mendiluce of
the Commons).

patents.142. Nevertheless, the potential for greenwashing
is apparent in this fund. A recent WBCSD press
release announced that HP “became the latest company
to release some of its intellectual property to the
public good, with three green patents added to the
[Commons].143 Because the Commons was created by
corporate interests, and is evidently still administered
by such, the resulting functionality of the Commons
may arguably serve as little more than a vertically
integrated PR machine.144 Too much self-interested
investment in the Eco-Patent Commons at the expense
of environmental goals or cleantech innovation could
preclude exemption.
D. Summary
Having analyzed a popular, socially beneficial
international patent pool for the applicability of United
States tax provisions rewarding charitable dissemination
of IP, some conclusions can be made about the state
of United States tax policy. First, there is limited
opportunity for domestic patent pools to mirror the
goodwill successes of the Commons. In that sense,
little has changed since the bleak 2006 report by XuanThao Nguyen and Jeffrey A. Maine, critiquing United
States policy limitations that dissuade charitable IP
giving, and thus national IP development.145 However,
there are clear loopholes through which a patent
pool may operate to encourage charitable giving
upon careful crafting. Thus, a patent pool with a
social or charitable mission receiving contributions of
valid and valuable patents may qualify its donors for
charitable deductions if 1) relational boundaries are
observed, 2) donors are not motivated primarily by
pecuniary or nonpecuniary interests of a commercially
beneficial nature, 3) and patents are donated wholly
and purposefully without reservation. If the current
collective greenwashing becomes actual greenthinking,
a U.S. Commons with maximized tax benefits is viable,
for the cleantech industry at least, even under restrictive
tax policies.

142. See Bowman, supra note 108.
143. See World Bus. Council For Sustainable Dev. (WBCSD),
Press Release (July 1, 2010) http://www.wbcsd.org. The author is
unfamiliar with any green patenting or other color-coding practices
of the USPTO.
144. In the June 2010 Commons newsletter, primary contacts
include a vice president and corporate counsel of IBM.
145. See Nguyen & Maine, supra note 67.

American University Intellectual Property Brief

43

